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 Despite experiencing a fairly calm period of racial integration, Atlanta’s inner-city region 
is one of the most racially segregated metropolitan areas in the nation. This division spans all 
components of Atlanta’s culture, including, most importantly, the Atlanta Public School System 
(APS). Children in Atlanta are neither learning within a racially diverse atmosphere nor 
receiving a quality, well-rounded education to properly prepare them for life’s challenges. The 
development of the APS between 1950-1980 was characterized by distinct periods of 
segregation, desegregation, attempted integration, White flight, and resegregation. It is through 
this process that the demographics of the system made a complete 180-degree turn, going from a 
majority White system in the early 1950s to an almost 100% Black system in the early 1990s.   
The continual sense of under-achievement, repeated poor rates of student retention, and 
an overall lack of quality classroom experiences within the majority Black APS all contribute to 
an unequal distribution of opportunity and support across the metro-Atlanta region since most 
majority White suburban districts bordering the city of Atlanta have the resources that the APS 
lacks, for example, generous funding, high parent involvement, engaged students, and a highly-
qualified teachers. Ultimately, this unequal distribution contributes to the achievement gap, 
which is broadly defined as the gross disparity between average standardized test scores of White 
students and Black students. This paper focuses on the long-term effects of desegregation and 
resegregation, showing how Atlanta’s unique racial history molded its educational system into a 
state of desperation. Atlanta’s development as an emerging metropolitan region set the stage for 
a complicated, up-hill battle to create a uniform, diverse educational system that produces high-
achieving graduates and promotes life-long learning.  
 
 1 
Determining the implications of resegregation in the Atlanta Public 
School System and its affect on student achievement  
 
The city of Atlanta has seen its share of significant events that affected not only the 
Southeastern region, but the country as a whole. The city’s diverse demographic composition 
continues to serve as an inexhaustible feeding ground for innovative social change. Atlantans 
boast of their ancestors’ great strides in developing a “city too busy to hate” through the 
promotion of a healthy relationship between the private and public sector while supporting a 
better quality of life for all. Those positive accomplishments unfortunately overshadowed any 
negative consequences that were inadvertently embedded within Atlanta’s economic sector 
through the course of the city’s development. Today substantial racial segregation continues to 
separate the city, even though Atlanta is heralded as having established good race relations early 
on. Incredibly high rates of inner-city poverty lie in stark contrast against Atlanta’s façade of 
economic success and prosperity. These disparities reflect the current state of an “Atlanta 
Paradox.”1  Despite experiencing a relatively calm period of racial integration and subsequently 
transforming into a “magnet for Blacks,” Atlanta’s inner-city region is one of the most racially 
segregated metropolitan areas in the nation.2  Racial division spans all components of Atlanta’s 
culture. Residents are still contending with the aftermath of racially divisive local- and state-level 
policymaking during the Civil Rights Era. Native Atlantans first experience a vast lack of 
diversity when they begin school in the Atlanta Public School System (APS). Immersed in a 
community of teachers, administrators, staff, and peers from the same racial background, 
children in Atlanta are not learning how to interact in a racially diverse atmosphere and most are 
not receiving a quality, well-rounded education to prepare them for adulthood. 
In the 2008-2009 school year, APS student demographics were as follows: 83% Black, 
10% White, 5% Hispanic, 1% Multiracial, and 1% Asian.3  However, 2009 statistics showing the 
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demographic composition of the entire city of Atlanta were as follows: 51.4% Black, 41.4% 
White, 3.1% Asian, 2.2% Other, and 1.8% Multiracial.  Taking a closer look at statistics only 
concerning the school-aged population in Atlanta in 2009, 26.9% of people under 18 in Atlanta 
were White, 65.25% of people that age were Black, and about 2.87% of this age group identified 
with two or more races.4  This broad data shows an obvious difference between the racial 
makeup of the school system and that of the geographical area that surrounds the system. These 
inconsistent statistics are more than just a representation of Atlanta’s status as a demographic 
anomaly, though. The current status of the Atlanta Public Schools (APS) as a racially 
homogeneous system (with the vast majority of students, teachers, and administrators coming 
from minority groups) reflects the inability of Atlanta’s leaders to develop a diverse, dynamic, 
long-term educational structure for Atlanta’s children. This failure can be attributed to 
overwhelming challenges, such as coordinated state and local efforts to conserve segregated 
schooling during the Civil Rights Era, persistent setbacks due to widespread White flight towards 
Atlanta’s suburbs, failed planning and organization on the part of Atlanta’s Black populace, the 
conservation of de facto segregation through the Compromise of 1973 (an action plan sanctioned 
by Atlanta’s NAACP that placed limitations on the potential diversity of the APS as a whole), 
and the inability of the United States courts to establish judicial precedence to support the 
proliferation of policies that mandate integrated schools and districts. 
The graduation rate within the APS was at a shockingly low 39.0% for the 2001-2002 
school year. Since then, it has risen to 66.3% in 2009-2010, but that is still significantly lower 
than the current statewide average of 80.8%. (See: Table 1)5 In addition to poor retention rates, 
the APS lacks adequate post-secondary preparation for high school students – only 33.1% of the 
graduating class of 2008 went on to attend college. For the past seven consecutive years the APS 
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has failed to meet Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) requirements as defined by the 2001 Federal 
No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB).6  AYP is an annual measure of student participation and 
achievement on statewide assessments and according to other academic indicators, focusing on 
accountability at all levels.7 Since APS has not met AYP for seven years, the district has had to 
undergo system-wide corrective action, alternative governance, and restructuring. Under NCLB, 
students who are attending a school that did not make AYP individually have the option to apply 
for a transfer to a different school in the district that did meet AYP. However, only six APS high 
schools were accepting transfers for the 2010-2011 school year and thirteen high schools were 
eligible for students to transfer out. Consequently, from 2007-2010, only between 1.3–3.7% of 
students eligible for transfers within the system actually moved to a different school.8 
The continual lack of progress within the APS demonstrates that the district is incapable 
of providing students with the resources they need for post-secondary education or successful job 
placement after graduation. The lack of stimulating resources produces an unhealthy learning 
environment in which educators constantly struggle to effectively connect with each child, 
causing an unequal distribution of opportunity and support. These deficiencies ultimately 
develop into an achievement gap, causing APS students to fall behind their peers in other 
systems who have both strong support at home and abundant resources at school. Over 70% of 
APS students have been eligible for free and reduced meals since 2002 and the challenges they 
face growing up in poverty make it even more important that they are given equal treatment 
within the education system – if they have less in comparison to their middle-class peers at 
home, shouldn’t they at least have an equal chance for success at school? Unfortunately, though, 
without the proper means to overcome their obstacles, the academic achievement levels of 
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students in the APS usually lag behind their peers who attend public schools in surrounding 
districts that receive more funding, more parental support, and more student participation.9   
This paper analyzes the development of the APS to find the connection between past 
policies that shaped the district and the current status of the system today. It will focus on the 
long-term effects of desegregation and resegregation, showing how Atlanta’s unique, urban 
racial history molded its educational system into its current state and how an achievement gap 
has risen from these failures, causing Atlanta’s students to consistently fall behind students in the 
surrounding area, the state of Georgia, and the nation as a whole. This investigation will show 
that rather than solely being the fault of the district’s leadership in the past ten years, the APS’s 
repeated failure to meet Georgia’s educational standards can be attributed to a myriad of 
conditions. These circumstances include the dichotomy of a racist political leadership and an 
activist Black elite during the era of school desegregation, Atlanta’s distinct urban growth 
patterns, the business-oriented mindset of municipal leaders after integration was complete, and 
the appearance of a schism between Atlanta’s Black leadership and the NAACP concerning 
school policies after desegregation was legally complete. Atlanta’s experiences as an emerging 
metropolitan region set the stage for a complicated, up-hill battle to create a uniform, diverse 
educational system that produces high-achieving graduates and promotes life-long learning. 
During the 20th century, Atlanta saw phenomenal population growth: between 1960 and 
2000, alone, the number of residents increased by 38.93%. As more and more people flocked to 
Atlanta, city planners and municipal leaders responded by building accommodating 
communities. Prior to Civil Rights legislation, however, all decisions maintained a strictly 
segregated neighborhood structure. Whether it was through zoning, public housing construction, 
community annexation, or the use of public highways as dividers, “White city leaders planned to 
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guide and segregate the Black population and maintain a majority White city.”10 This inherent 
sense of racial inequality in urban development was also a cornerstone upon which White 
educational leaders built the Atlanta Public School System. As the city was turning into a 
“world-class” metro-region, public schools remained separate and unequal between Whites and 
Blacks. 
Beginning in 1954 with the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown vs. Board of Education 
of Topeka, Kansas, the concept of school desegregation took hold of the American political 
agenda and media outlets, persisting as one of the most important facets of racial integration at 
that time. Atlanta was geographically split upon strict racial boundaries in the 1950s and the 
city’s leaders turned a cold shoulder to the idea of integrated schools. State leaders even went so 
far as to enact laws that “included a plan for private schools and the closing of public ones, rather 
than desegregate them.”11  In 1961, the school board adopted a plan for the gradual 
desegregation of Atlanta’s schools, directed by the federal district court and due to the success of 
the NAACP’s suit, Calhoun v. Latimer. This plan, known as the “Freedom-of-Choice” program, 
called for the gradual desegregation of the city’s schools at the rate of one grade per year, 
beginning with the eleventh and twelfth grades the first year. It stipulated that children were free 
to choose which school they would attend. In the eyes of Black families, though, this new 
“freedom-of-choice” was not free at all. In order to be granted a transfer into a White school, a 
Black student’s parents were interviewed, the student was required to undergo a “personality 
interview,” and the student needed to make satisfactory scores on scholastic and aptitude tests.12  
The plan failed to integrate schools at a sufficient rate and by 1966-67, 95% of Atlanta’s students 
were still attending segregated schools.  
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At that point, the Atlanta Board of Education had anticipated federal action and had 
ordered the complete desegregation of all grades in 1965-66. This order, lacking support for 
implementation, did nothing to further integrate the schools. By the end of the 1965-66 school 
year, only six schools could be defined as desegregated (more than 10% minority students), 
while there were 62 schools with 90+% Black students and 73 schools with 90+% White 
students. Since the Freedom-of-Choice plan did not successfully integrate the APS schools, in 
1970 the federal district court ordered that the system provide free transportation to Black 
students, so they could attend the school of their choice. This plan was coined the “Majority-to-
Minority” (M & M) transfer program since it required that students who represented the majority 
in a certain school be transferred to a school in which students from their race represented the 
minority. So, a school with a majority of Black students would have a portion of those Black 
students transferred to a school that had a minority of Black students (and a majority of White 
students), and vice versa. Transitioning students of both races into schools that had a minority of 
students within their race would assumingly balance the race ratios at most APS schools, and, at 
the very least, go further than the Freedom-of-Choice program in effectively establishing a more 
racially balanced educational structure. However, once the voluntary/application-based 
integration ended and the mandatory busing program began, White middle-class families began 
to leave Atlanta’s inner-city region en mass, fearing the effects of keeping their children in 
integrated schools. 
John Letson, APS Superintendent from 1960-1973, attempted to delay desegregation as 
long as possible following the Freedom-of-Choice plan. Rather than choosing the quickest 
method to eliminate the dual school system, Letson supported a “go-slow program” giving 
Whites time to flee and even going so far as to announce the approaching integration of an all-
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White school by sending letters to the students’ parents, encouraging them to leave before the 
Black students arrive.13  As White families moved to the suburbs and out of the APS, Black 
families replaced them at much higher rates: in 1960-61, the school system lost 1,072 White 
students and gained 3,064 more Black students. This expanding ratio of Black to White students 
resulted in overcrowding within majority-Black schools since Letson and the school board 
refused to reallocate resources to accommodate the growing Black student population.14  Vast 
inequalities among APS schools were made clear in 1968 with the publication of the Better 
Schools Report by Better-Schools Atlanta, a biracial organization that sought to “bolster the 
claims of Blacks that racial inequalities persisted in the school system.” The report announced 
that students in Atlanta’s Black elementary schools had larger class sizes, fewer textbooks, and a 
lower proportionate value of available equipment. Furthermore, the 1968 report claimed that by 
the time Black students reached the fourth grade, they were one grade level behind their White 
peers; by the eighth grade, that gap widened to four years.15  These statistics provide a very 
important perspective in understanding the origins and development of the achievement gap in 
the APS – in 1968 Black students’ lack of resources was beginning to have a detrimental effect 
on their learning and, therefore, set them behind their White counterparts as most substantive 
resources for success were withheld from their schools and transferred to the majority White 
institutions. 
The future implications of consistently underfunding majority Black schools were, for the 
most part, ignored during the 1960s-70s. Due to the changing school structure under these 
various integration plans, the APS Board of Education as a leading body operating under 
Superintendent Letson was uninterested in improving the lives of poor minority students, who 
comprised a greater percentage of the APS population, year after year. Before desegregation, 
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Black schools existed in the shadows of White schools, receiving used textbooks and operating 
out of smaller, worn-out facilities. During desegregation, White school officials were able to 
continue the state of inequality as Black families completely took over middle-class White 
neighborhoods since property values had plummeted, and previously all-White schools 
transitioned to almost all-Black schools, making it easy for the school board to solely focus their 
resources on the remaining all-White schools. After desegregation, when the system’s 
demographics had made a complete turnaround, Black activists and educators stepped in with 
plans for “produc[ing] an excellent educational system for Black students” – plans that 
ultimately fell through due to lack of coordination, commitment, and financial resources.16   
Rather than being founded in a sense of progress by taking action in order to create a 
more efficient education system, all attempts to lawfully desegregate the Atlanta Public School 
System during 1950-70 were made in reaction to whatever mandate the School Board was 
handed. The government, civil rights groups, and community activist organizations repeatedly 
reprimanded the Atlanta School Board.17  As Atlanta’s schools developed during the 1970s, 
Black families saw an opportunity for their children to reap the apparent benefits of attending 
White schools. As Black students became the majority in most APS schools, the racial 
demographics of the teachers, administrators, and other school staff members also conformed to 
this growing racial homogeneity. As the schools underwent this transition, the general mindset 
within communities surrounding the schools also changed. Rather than continue struggling to 
create an environment in which each race was equally represented, Black parents put their trust 
in Black community leaders to take administrative positions within the district and, thereafter, to 
make the “right” decisions for Atlanta’s Black students. Unfortunately, however, these hopes for 
a better quality of education never came to fruition.  
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The Compromise of 1973 was the integration plan implemented after White flight took its 
toll on the racial composition of Atlanta’s population – for the 1971-72 school year, the APS had 
71,000 Black students and only 28,000 White students – in stark contrast with the 1960-61 
school year, which had 57,120 White students and 44,880 Black students.18  In part, the plan was 
compiled by some of Atlanta’s most influential Black leaders, including Benjamin E. Mays 
(former President of Morehouse College and the first Black person elected to head the Atlanta 
school board), Lyndon Wade (Director of the Atlanta Urban League), Lonnie C. King, Jr. 
(President of the Atlanta NAACP), and Jesse Hill (President of Atlanta Life Insurance 
Company), and was presented by the Atlanta NAACP. These men represented the Black 
community during school integration discussions with White business and professional leaders. 
They spoke on behalf of the families, asking for a 78% increase in the number of children 
attending desegregated schools and a 91% increase in the number of desegregated school 
facilities in addition to the appointment of a Black Superintendent and various Black personnel 
to top-level positions, increasing the administration’s race ratio to almost 50-50.19  In exchange 
for these modifications, there would be no more busing within the district in an attempt to 
distribute the dwindling population of White students throughout the entire district. Looking at 
Tables 2a and 2b, a more complete picture of the Compromise plan shows exactly what was 
“compromised” on both sides of the table.  
In the end, the Compromise only integrated 3 of the system’s 86 segregated Black 
schools, contrary to both the requests of the School Board (who wanted to integrate 10) and the 
NAACP (who wanted to integrate 27). Also, the plan ended up moving only 4% of the 59,826 
segregated Black students to integrated schools, even though the School Board requested that 9% 
be moved and the NAACP requested 30%. In contrast, the plan ultimately integrated 100% of 
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the mere 20 segregated White schools that remained in 1973, moving all of the 7,728 segregated 
White students to integrated schools. Furthermore, according to this student assignment plan, “no 
school would contain less than 30% Black students” and “White students would be transferred 
only into schools where the resulting enrollment would be 30% White.”20  Integrating White 
students into previously integrated schools and leaving the majority of Black students in 
segregated Black schools was counterproductive to the ultimate vision of the national NAACP, 
which was to have a mix of Black and White students in the majority of schools, with as few 
segregated Black schools as possible. It was during the debate over the plan that Atlanta’s Black 
leadership, under the direction of Lonnie King (Atlanta NAACP President), shifted their focus 
from the national NAACP’s insistence of placing White and Black children in the same 
classrooms to the idea that Black children would be “ensur[ed] improved education – whether in 
racially separate or integrated schools.”21   
As Atlanta’s NAACP leadership recognized and affirmed that all-Black schools would no 
longer be seen as inherently inferior and integration was not the only means of achieving equal 
educational opportunities for Black children, they effectively “conceded the futility of total 
desegregation [within] the APS.”  The Atlanta NAACP’s decision to halt their demands for 
cross-town busing in return for the placement of Black educators and administrators in high-level 
positions was vehemently opposed by the national NAACP and, consequently, appealed in the 
U.S. District Court (Atlanta) by the NAACP Legal Defense Fund and the Atlanta branch of the 
American Civil Liberties Union. The appeal was subsequently denied by the court, but the 
national NAACP, under Executive Director Roy Wilkins, took action into their own hands by 
suspending Atlanta’s local chapter from the national organization and removing local NAACP 
leaders from their executive positions. Within the city, though, both White and Black leaders 
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praised the plan as “Black leaders asserted that the time had come to move beyond the goal of 
integration as an end in itself toward that of providing high-quality education for all children” 
and White leaders “welcomed the compromise as further evidence of Atlanta’s character as the 
‘city too busy to hate.’”22  
Even though the plan was heralded as a breakthrough in solving Atlanta’s educational 
problems, looking at the situation from a more practical viewpoint, there were just “not enough 
Whites to go around” and, therefore, Black leaders felt they had no choice.23  Lonnie King 
claims that the Black community did not actually give anything up with the implementation of 
this plan and, therefore, it was not a compromise – it had only been labeled as such within the 
media. He said that reporters were attempting to link this education plan to Booker T. 
Washington’s historical “Atlanta Compromise” speech, which supported an “accomodationist” 
strategy of Black response to racial tension in the South by promoting a sense of shared 
responsibility. King insists that this was not the case within the APS because there was, to put it 
bluntly, “nothing to be shared.”  Black students held a system-wide majority by the time the plan 
was implemented, and White school board leaders had made it blatantly obvious that they would 
never support fully integrated classrooms, as evinced by their passive acceptance of White flight 
out of the district. Black leaders saw it as their personal responsibility to achieve “greater control 
over the education decisions that [affected Black] children [in Atlanta.]”24   
Continuing to analyze the sequence of events during the 1970s-80s that set the stage for a 
resegregated school system in Atlanta, it is important to understand the role the courts played by 
not only inhibiting previously successful integration policies, but also by setting precedence to 
conveniently ignore changing residential patterns and support anti-integration policies within 
many areas that were already struggling with population fluctuations. For example, looking at 
	  
 12 
Atlanta in 1960, there were a little more than 300,000 Whites living in the city.  Over 10 years, 
60,000 Whites fled the area, and during the 1970s, another 100,000 Whites left, fleeing to the 
suburbs and creating a tremendous rift in the previously crafted social structure.  Rather than 
realizing these substantial changes and devising new plans that could possibly counteract the de 
facto resegregation of previously segregated White communities into segregated Black 
communities in the 1970s, the Supreme Court consistently ruled against civil rights advocates 
and “dramatically limited the effectiveness of efforts to achieve desegregation and equal 
educational opportunity.”25 As a result of changing urban demographics, school desegregation 
efforts instead needed to create interdistrict solutions26 involving multiple school districts within 
a geographical area during the 1980s if there was to be any hope of a demonstrated increase in 
the number of integrated schools. In 1974, Detroit-area schools were involved in the Milliken v. 
Bradley (1974) case, in which a federal district court mandated a necessary multidistrict remedy 
to end du jure segregation in the area due to the mass exodus of White families out of the urban 
area and the overwhelming concentration of Black families within the city limits. The Supreme 
Court, however, ruled that this multidistrict technique was impermissible, concluding that 
“without an interdistrict violation and interdistrict effect, there is no constitutional wrong calling 
for an interdistrict remedy.”27   
A more pertinent example of the courts’ damaging dismissal of multidistrict integration 
arose from none other than our very own Atlanta, Georgia: Armour v. Nix, filed in 1972 and 
finally heard in 1978. The plaintiffs, Black parents with children attending Atlanta area schools, 
requested that an interdistrict remedy be implemented in order to created a truly integrated 
school system. After the liability portion of the trial during which some of the accused school 
systems were dismissed, the U.S. District Court in Atlanta heard the four remaining defendants 
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in March of 1978: the DeKalb County BOE, the Fulton County BOE, the APS, and the State 
BOE. The plaintiffs (Black parents) claimed there was “evidence of historical governmental 
activity [that] tended to separate residents on a racial basis within the city” and, therefore, they 
demanded there be “interdistrict transfers of students to correct the effects of prior unlawful 
agreements between school districts to concentrate Black residents within one area and exclude 
them largely from others.”28 Even though the parents exhibited evidence of residential violations 
that had previously excluded Blacks from certain areas, they failed to show that there had been a 
constitutional violation with an interdistrict effect.29 And, without an interdistrict effect, the court 
stated that there could be no justified interdistrict remedy, citing the decision in Milliken v. 
Bradley as precedence for this decision. Additionally, the court maintained that once a school 
system is “operating under a court-imposed plan and has not been shown to be in violation of 
that plan, the fact that the system has ‘slipped out of compliance’ with the precise terms of the 
plan due to normal demographic shifts in population [does] not justify judicial intervention.”30 
Therefore, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s action, finding that governmental discrimination in 
housing and schools had ended before the action was filed.  
The question is, however, how the court was able to declare schools in the area as not 
under the vestiges of discrimination at the time the case was filed, since it was officially opened 
in 1972, before the Compromise of 1973 was even discussed or implemented and while the APS 
still held a significant amount of racially segregated schools. Furthermore, at that point the 
system was still without any clear plan for the future other than the Majority-to-Minority 
program, which did nothing to increase racial inequality in the system. These court rulings had 
substantial effects on all metropolitan areas within the Southern U.S. that had experienced White 
flight as a result of integration fears and racist tendencies. 
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Another important aspect of schooling that could have been remedied by the courts but 
was unfortunately disregarded and therefore negatively affected the quality of education many 
Black students during the 1970s was the gross disparity in school funding. Two different 
Supreme Court cases31 concluded that the state had plausible concerns about maintaining “local 
control” of education funding that was constitutionally adequate, rejected the notion that 
education is a fundamental right, and then reaffirmed that education is not a fundamental right 
under the Equal Protection Clause. These national measures, combined with the effects of 
Atlanta’s Compromise of 1973 permanently plagued the Atlanta Public School System in a cycle 
of segregated schooling, unable to overcome the problem of White flight through lack of any 
successful measures, which may could have included interdistrict remedies and a nationally 
equalized source of educational funding. 
The Court’s lack of aggression and determination concerning the permanent eradication 
of segregated schooling, coupled with unbiased decision-making, resulted in a nationwide escape 
from the desegregation efforts of the late 1960s-early 1970s. Not only was intra-city busing not 
an option after these initiatives were implemented – now there existed no possibility of 
transferring students between districts, either. The Atlanta region was at a standstill regarding the 
demographic composition of its schools and yet, there were still more roadblocks to be met in the 
near future. And, it is at this juncture that Dr. Alonzo Crim became the first Black APS 
Superintendent in August 1973.  
Crim’s duty as leader of Black education in Atlanta was a daunting task and during his 
time on the administration, he was both praised for “managing an urban educational program that 
really works” and reproached when the next year’s test scores ranked APS students at the very 
bottom state-wide (behind poor, rural, all-Black systems).32 Into the 1970s-80s, Atlanta’s public 
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schools were resegregated with a quickly emerging and fast growing Black student majority.33  
Statistically, in 1968, there were 38% White students and 62% Black in the APS. By 1980, those 
numbers changed drastically, to 8% White and 91% Black and in 1988, there were 7% White 
students and 92% Black students. The Exposure Index (a percentage of Blacks’ schoolmates who 
were White) for Atlanta’s schools remained very consistent from 1968-1988, dropping only from 
5.7% to 3.9%. This is a stark indication that neither the Compromise of 1973 nor any of the other 
desegregation programs helped to diversify the APS student population.34 No possible inner-city 
integration plan could change these statistics beginning in the late 1980s – the APS was primed 
to begin the 21st century as a resegregated, racially homogenous system. 
The consideration of race relations on a broader scale also adds an important piece of the 
puzzle in order to determine how resegregation has affected schooling and achievement in 
Atlanta. By focusing on wide-ranging racial trends, distinct social tendencies can be detected and 
their implications can be understood within Atlanta’s specific conditions. These extrapolations 
provide insight for Atlanta’s future, possibly helping the community to generate solutions that 
will help the APS move past resegregation. So, when comparing the Southern U.S. with other 
regions across the nation, there was and continues to be substantially more contact between 
Black and White students in the South than in other areas of the country.  The South also remains 
the only region with a significant number of Black students in the education system. These 
phenomena can simply be attributed to the fact that most Black Americans were located in the 
South during the beginnings of desegregation, and, consequently, since the South has 
proportionally more Black families than any other U.S. region, as integration took hold the South 
actually transitioned into the most integrated regions in the U.S. These positive changes toward 
integrated communities did, in some cases, translate into other facets of life in the regional 
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South, namely educational systems. And, even though there were certainly periods of success in 
achieving school integration well into the 1980s, there has been a steady decline in the number of 
students attending interracial schools in the South since the early 1990s. Gary Orfield analyzes 
this phenomenon and provides telling statistical data in his piece, Schools More Separate. 
Looking at Table 3,35 it is evident that after peaking in 1988 with 43.5% of Black students in 
majority White schools, there has been a steady decline over ten years in the South, with only 
32.7% of Black students attending majority White schools in 1998.  
Regionally, in the South schools are not only becoming more Black – they are becoming 
more White, too. Residential segregation is creating racially homogeneous communities in both 
urban and suburban areas. Since this change has been gradual over the past decade, legislators 
and judges are less likely to concede these setbacks, failing to notice the negative changes. Many 
Southern regions are clamoring to terminate their desegregation plans – not necessarily in an 
attempt to make schools segregated again, but in an attempt to prove that they have completed 
the arduous process and have established a seemingly peaceful community and unified school 
system. However, even though a community may claim to have a strong hold on racial equality 
and interracial living, Orfield claims that “most Americans live in metropolitan areas, housing 
remains seriously segregated, and most current segregation is between school districts of 
different racial composition, not within individual districts.”36 
Freeman agrees with this analysis and goes further to interpret segregation within 
Georgia: “the observed racial makeup of students differs more when one compares school 
districts [with one another] than if one looks across schools within [the same] districts.”37 This 
conclusion is in-line with the present day situation in and around metro-Atlanta. The Atlanta 
Public School System is a city district, geographically located within Fulton County, but serving 
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only those students who live within the city limits. The Fulton County School System serves 
families who live within the county’s borders, but outside of the city limits. By comparing the 
racial demographics and the poverty level (as determined by those students who are eligible for 
free and reduced lunch) of these two school systems, many trends show interdistrict 
differentiation on the grounds of race and student achievement. Analysis of the similarities and 
differences between the two districts shows how each district’s racial makeup has an impact on 
student achievement, and the validity of such analysis is affirmed by Freeman’s previously stated 
conclusions regarding resegregation trends in Georgia state schools.  
Looking at Table 4, it is noted that in APS schools, the percentage of nonwhite students 
has increased +4% between 2002-2010 and in Fulton County it has increased +12%. This high 
increase in Fulton County’s nonwhite student population suggests that some minority families 
are moving out of the inner city region and transitioning to the more suburban areas immediately 
surrounding the city. This would be a positive change if it was creating a more racially equal 
atmosphere in Fulton County, but the statistics also show a an -11% decrease in the number of 
White students in the system. The implications of these demographic changes in Fulton County 
are very similar to those of White flight on the APS back in the 1970s-80s: instead of combining 
the minority and majority races in schools through integration, minority students end up 
replacing the majority student population and the school gradually makes a 180-degree turn to 
being completely segregated within the opposite race. In alignment with the changes in Fulton 
County’s racial composition as Black families are branching out of the city and into the suburbs, 
the number of students in the APS at poverty level has seen a -2% change and in Fulton County 
there has been a +11% increase in the number of students at poverty level. These complementary 
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changes38 indicate that the movement of the nonwhite population into Fulton County correlates 
to the movement of families below the poverty line out of the inner-city region.  
Considering that Fulton County schools saw a large increase in the proportion of 
nonwhite students and a coordinating increase in the number of students in poverty, it is apparent 
that in Atlanta and its immediate Metro region, the suburban school systems are becoming 
segregated at a much faster pace than the Atlanta City schools. However, this interpretation must 
be taken in context since there has been little divergence in the proportion of White vs. nonwhite 
students, as well as among those who are living in poverty in the Atlanta city area. This is direct 
evidence that correlates Freeman’s findings in 2001 to present-day developments in Atlanta. She 
stated that by 2001, the segregation indexes39 of urban and suburban districts were almost equal, 
showing that residential segregation in inner-city regions is merging into the surrounding 
suburban regions, creating even more segregated school atmospheres and promulgating the 
problems that districts have proven incapable of fixing, to this day. The higher the segregation 
index, the greater the degree of black-white segregation, and in 2001 Georgia’s urban districts 
measured 62.9 and the suburban districts measured 63.9. These indices correlate directly to the 
changing ratios of White to nonwhite students, also seen in the Table 4. In the Fulton County 
system, the ratio has decreased exponentially in 8 years, with a 0.32 decrease and a substantial 
differentiation in the number of nonwhite students compared to Whites. In 2002, the system was 
significantly integrated with a 0.85 ratio. However, in just 8 years, the ratio decreased to a 0.53. 
In the APS, there has been miniscule growth towards racial equality, with a mere 0.04 increase in 
the White to nonwhite ratio between 2002-2010. This change is in stark contrast with the great 
decrease in Fulton County’s racial equality. 
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Trends of increasing resegregation have often been dismissed because many Southerners 
believe that there is simply “nothing” that can be done. Orfield draws a compelling conclusion in 
his report, Schools More Separate, focusing on the need for more stable residential integration 
through successful strategies that compel White homeowners to embrace integrated communities 
and schools. He points out that “many suburban communities are now facing the problems of 
unstable and rapidly changing racial enrollments and the emergence of segregated schools and 
communities.”40 This is exactly the trend that Fulton County is experiencing through the 
dispersion of minority families from the city of Atlanta into the surrounding neighborhoods, and 
it is clearly seen in the data presented. Attracting white families into these rapidly-changing 
suburbs is integral to our success in racial equality – if suburbs can’t resolve these challenges, 
then the trends will continue and educational systems will continue to become more and more 
segregated, following residential patterns and growth.41 
The Black community relied on APS officials to make the ‘right’ decisions when it came 
to school curriculums, policies, regulations, new school construction, and zoning requirements in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. Since then, however, any expanded availability of educational 
opportunities for APS students has gone unnoticed; higher rates of student success and 
achievement have not been reflected in test scores, graduation rates, or post-secondary education. 
Within Atlanta, racial division and segregation led to a general sense of apathy towards the 
poorly run educational infrastructure. A disproportionate number of youth in poverty attend APS 
schools, and disinterested students, who represent specific racial and social class groups, have 
led the APS to a downward decline. The demographics of APS students have continued to 
change throughout the 1990s-2000s, with a steady increase in the percentage of students who 
receive Free and Reduced Lunch from 2003-2009. (See: Graph 1) Even though the district’s 
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racial composition remains majority Black, there has been a steady decline of Black students as a 
percentage of the student population from 1994-2008, falling from 90.53% to 82.76%. At the 
same time, White students as a percentage of the student population have grown substantially 
from 1994-2008, increasing from 6.68% to 10.25%.42  Even though these statistics show a 
promising future for racial diversity, statistics concerning student indicators/retention rates, 
standardized test scores, and post-secondary education still place the APS at the bottom of the 
nation’s school districts.  
One statistical indicator that has been previously touched on shows the discrepancy 
between the success of APS students and that of students in nearby districts – its called the the 
achievement gap and it is loosely defined as the difference between average standardized test 
scores of Black students and average standardized test scores of White students. Urban regions 
are most known for harboring an achievement gap within their city school system as the district 
as often aggregately receives lower scores when compared to a suburban district. There are 
numerous contributing factors, but consistent characteristics include a disparity between the 
achievement levels of middle-income White students and the achievement levels of low-income 
non-White students (who, most often, represent the majority of the student population in urban 
school districts).43  Studies that analyze the achievement gap most often look at math and reading 
test scores at the 4th and 8th grade levels. These indicators are used throughout the nation and 
provide a constant variable for comparison. When looking at APS student performance, it is 
obvious that there are widespread issues preventing children from learning at a decent level. In 
2003, the Achievement-Level Percentage (ALP) for APS students in grade 4 math was 50% 
below basic and by 2009 it decreased to 37% below basic. For students in grade 4 reading, the 
2002 ALP was 65% below basic, which decreased to 50% below basic in 2009. Looking at grade 
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8 math figures, the ALP for 2003 was 70% below basic, decreasing to 54% below basic in 2009. 
Lastly, for grade 8 reading figures, the ALP for 2002 was 58% below basic, dropping to 40% 
below basic in 2009.44 There are many other statistical figures that show Atlanta’s poor quality 
of education in comparison to national standards – a consistently low graduation rate, an 
unsatisfactory retention rate, poor attendance, and only a small percentage of students who go on 
to study at the post-secondary level (including both college and technical schools). As the 
proportion of middle-class students dropped in the APS through the late 1990s, at-risk Black 
children became the majority and the achievement gap became more than just a difference of test 
scores between students within the system. APS schools began to represent the harms of an 
achievement gap at a system-wide level, experiencing a sharp decline in each of the student 
indicators previously defined. 
“Anyone who wants to explore the continuing inequalities need only examine the test 
scores, drop out rates, and other statistics for various schools in a metropolitan community and 
relate them to statistics for school poverty (free lunch) and race (percent Black) to see a 
distressingly clear pattern.”45 Generally, standardized test scores are the lowest from minority 
and low-income schools, and there is a very strong correlation between the percentage of 
students in poverty and the average test score of a student body.46 Minority students in at-risk 
schools face many more challenges and roadblocks and experience far less inter-class 
competition when preparing for life after the K-12 stage. Many poor students do not even have 
the opportunity to take Advanced Placement classes in order to prepare for college because there 
just are not enough qualified teachers available. Furthermore, high teacher turnover (a teacher 
leaving his or her school for any reason) is also an issue in minority schools. For example, in 
Georgia, White teacher turnover is much higher in predominately Black schools: in 2000, 31.2% 
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of White teachers in Georgia schools with greater than 70% Black students left at the end of the 
school year. Not only is there high turnover with White teachers in predominately Black schools; 
in 2000, 20.6% of Black teachers at >70% Black schools left at the end of the year. It is clear that 
economically disadvantaged students are destined at the outset to experience hardships that 
students in higher socioeconomic communities do not ever see or know.47 
Realizing the gross inequities in educational opportunity that have been forged by years 
of racism, urban renewal, and segregation in Atlanta is the first step towards fixing the problem. 
In her article, “Social Class in Public Schools,” Jennifer Hochschild explains the hardships that 
students face in urban school systems by outlining certain “nested inequalities” which are based 
on social class. She describes the “disproportionate failure of urban schools,” noting that class 
and race are most often indistinguishable when characterizing students in the nation’s worst 
schools. The connection between race and social status and how often those attributes completely 
determine a child’s ultimate level of education shows a “deeply embedded pattern of class 
disparities in schooling.”48 Racially homogenous structures like the APS push society away from 
the goal of diversity and equality. If children grow up surrounded only by people of the same 
race and ethnicity, then they will not be taught to accept others because they simply will not 
interact with them. A lack of respect for and suspicion of someone “different” may pervade their 
lives through adulthood. This fact of life goes for all races and backgrounds.  
The APS molds the lives of almost 50,000 children and young adults every year. 
Structural racial divisions must be broken down in order to break the cycle of inadequacy in 
Atlanta’s public education. Once the APS realizes the appropriate course of action to support 
student opportunity and foster positive growth within its schools, Atlanta’s children will finally 
have the chance for a quality education. Unencumbered by the harsh vestiges of racism and 
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segregation, the APS has the potential to develop into a leader within the national realm of inner-
city education. 
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Source:	  Research	  Atlanta,	  Inc.	  "Analysis	  of	  Atlanta	  Compromise	  School	  Desegregation	  Plan,"	  1973,	  p.	  7.
-­‐	  65% -­‐	  100% 20
#	  desegregated	  schools:
47
#	  schools	  segregated	  
Black:
86
Change	  in	  number	  and	  
percentage	  of	  segregated	  
(White)	  schools
-­‐	  20 -­‐	  13 -­‐	  20 #	  schools	  segregated	  
White:
-­‐	  100%
#	  students	  in	  
desegregated	  schools:
27,	  239
#	  students	  in	  segregated	  
(Black)	  schools:
59,	  826
#	  students	  in	  segregated	  
(White)	  schools:
7,	  728
Change	  in	  number	  and	  
percentage	  of	  segregated	  
(Black)	  schools
-­‐	  27 -­‐	  10 -­‐	  3
-­‐	  31% -­‐	  12% -­‐	  3%
Increase	  in	  number	  and	  
percentage	  of	  
desegregated	  schools
+	  43 +	  10 +	  17
+	  91% +	  21% +	  36%
Change	  in	  number	  and	  
percentage	  of	  students	  
in	  segregated	  (White)	  
schools
-­‐	  7,728 -­‐	  5,179 -­‐	  7,728
-­‐	  100% -­‐	  86% -­‐	  100%
Change	  in	  number	  and	  
percentage	  of	  students	  
in	  segregated	  (Black)	  
schools
-­‐	  17,752 -­‐	  5,389 -­‐	  2,357
-­‐	  30% -­‐	  9% -­‐	  4%
Table	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+	  8,933 +	  11,479
+	  33% +	  42%
Black White Black White Black White
Level	  I	  ($42,500) 1 -­‐-­‐ 1 -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1
Level	  II	  ($30,000) 1 1 1 1 -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐
Level	  III	  ($19,500-­‐27,000) 2 7 4 5 2 5
Level	  IV	  ($17,000-­‐25,000) 2 3 3 2 2 3
Level	  IVa	  ($17,000-­‐25,000) 4 5 -­‐-­‐ -­‐-­‐ 1 5
Level	  V	  ($15,000-­‐23,000) 10 20 16 20 5 20
Level	  VI	  ($9,000-­‐19,000) 103 105 104 100 94 104
Total 123 141 129 128 104 138
Percentage 47% 53% 50% 50% 43% 57%
Source:	  Research	  Atlanta,	  Inc.	  "Analysis	  of	  Atlanta	  Compromise	  School	  Desegregation	  Plan,"	  1973,	  p.	  7.
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